The SOE reform in China
Zhou Dayong
Summer semester 2003
Europa-University Viadrina,Germany

Abstract:
The essay tries to study the process of the state-owned enterprise (SOE) reform in China. Chinese economic reform resulted in significant influences on all social aspects, SOEs as an especially economic sector suffers a change both in internal management as well in the outside economic environment. I try to discuss in the essay, that the Chinese SOE reform has made large progress, however, SOE can’t conquer many problems by itself, the resolution of SOE lies in elimination of SOE by a further reform including property transition and construction of a fairer market.


Outline
1. History of the SOE reform in China
2. The main problems left in the reform
3. The reasons of SOE problem behind
4. Argue of some reform plans and suggestion
5. Conclusion


1. The history of the SOEs reform in China
1.1 the establishment of SOE
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) came into power in Mainland China. One goal of the CCP was to lead China into a modern socialism society. In economic scale, it meant mainly industrialization. According to CCP’s policy, the form of industrial organization must be based upon state owned enterprises. The state-owned industrial system was set up by two ways. One was the new enterprise after the liberation. At the end WWII, most industrial sectors in China, such as communication network, transportation and power industry were destroyed and had to be rebuilt, at the same time, military industries and financial sector e.g. banking system was directly nationalized from the former control of Gongmin Party. Another way was transformation from the private ownership to state-owned enterprises. The private properties were regulated under state management, in some cases, for instance in commercial scale, the former private enterprises were bought by local government gradually. Till 1952, about 83% of industrial companies were controlled by the state; a socialism economic system was announced established. (Fig 1)
1.2 The reform began from 1978
Until Chinese economic reform began in 1978, public ownership in forms of state-owned and collectivized were only legal ownership of property. In industrial sector, the enterprises were controlled respectively under central or local governments, the latter made decisions for the enterprises, the enterprises were not profit seeking economic entities, they were simply workshops to execute centrally set policies.
In 1970s, the discontent of economic situation accumulated constantly, because the defects of central planning system became obviously more and more. Around 1978, the rural reform took place from grass roots and spread quickly, till 1982, the collectivized people commune had to be abolished. In company with the reform, the free market in a certain degree was developed. At the same time, the problem of lack of autonomy in SOE, which led to low efficiency, was also taken into account. Therefore, from 1978 on, the Communist Party, under the leading of Deng Xiaoping, put hand to solve the SOE problem. From 1978 to 1984, the efforts of the reform concentrated on giving the SOEs more autonomy by allowing them increased authority over the allocation of their profits, and limited production autonomy. The rest profits could be used either to finance increased investments or to pay bonuses to employees. Besides, administrative control over SOEs was decentralized to local governments. But as the prices were still centrally determined and SOEs did not realize the cost of their fixed and working capital, the reforms did not improve much the resource allocation or the utilization of capital. (1)

1.3 Contract is the main form in the second phase.
From 1985 to 1992 was the second phase of the SOE reform. The policy named Zhenqi Fenkai (separating government from enterprises), the central government decided to turn SOEs into truly independent production and management entities, and stipulate that enterprises must take responsibilities for their own profits and losses by means of contracts and leasing. The common practice was: the enterprises sign a manage contract with the responsible authorities. Under the contract, enterprises were not only allowed to retain the extra profits after they had fulfilled the contracted quotas, but also allowed to arrange their own manage including dismiss or enroll personnel. By the end of 1987, about 80% of state-owned industrial enterprises adopted the contracts system. In 1991, over 90% of the previously contracted enterprises signed the second round of contracts. Meanwhile, based on the first round contract practice, the content of the contract was improved; the authority introduced more rational norms to examine the fulfillment of contract. A multiple index system was formed, which included economic efficiency index, development potentiality index and management index etc.
During this period, the practice of shareholding reform appeared as well. This new creature was adopted at first by village enterprises, which come from the former collective enterprises. The village enterprises were always short of capital, so they raised money from the village residents. Along with the reform moved forward from countryside to cities, the shareholding system was also introduced into SOE reform. Early in April 1984 Chinese reform committee organized a seminar to discuss the exploitation of shareholding in SOE reform. That conference drew a conclusion that shareholding system is a rational way to restructure the collective and state owned enterprises in cities. In July the same year, the first shareholding company after Chinese liberation—Beijing Tianqiao department store (shareholding) came onto horizon. Till 1991, there were already 709 state owned enterprises restructured along shareholding system. These enterprises included industrial sector companies, trade companies, also financial enterprises, construction enterprises etc.
Besides, in the second phase of SOE reform, tax system had also a great change. Instead of handing in profit, SOEs paid a certain portion of tax according to their revenue level. The State and local government collected tax separately; this measure was implemented to loose the relation between SOE and local authority.
However, during this period, the SOEs showed their weakness in competition with the new developed private companies, joint venture companies and township and village enterprises, because at one side, the manager of SOEs didn’t get use to do business in a free market, the attitude of waiting, relying on government and begging for help were widespread. At another side, the relationship between government and enterprises became more complicated, because, although under the contract system, the government have no right to interfere in the SOEs management, they still rely on each other: the government need the SOE to have good performance in order to settle surplus labor forces and continue to play a role in maintain the social stability, at the same time, to increase the government’s revenue to deal with the raising infrastructure investment and other expense. The SOE, on the other side, need the protection of the authority, in order to obtain more chance to get loans, subsidizes or orders in government arranged projects. Besides, even though most of direct subsidies form the state have been cancelled, many domestic savings were also channeled into SOEs, because banks had been directed to take up the role of making "loans" to SOEs instead of the state. The total of non-performing loans has grown so large that it started to endanger the banking system. (2)

1.4 The MES is the key point in the third phase of the reform and the achievements
Form 1993 on, the reform moved into the third phase, the aim called setting up the modern enterprises system (MES). The Third Plenary Session of the 14th Party Central Committee in November 1993 proposed: "It is the inevitable request for market economy to set up modern enterprise system, it is a direction of the SOE reform of China. "This indicates that SOE reform enters a new stage of system innovation. In 1994 the State Council determined to chose 100 state-run large and medium-sized enterprises to launch an experiment to implement restructure along MES. The basic demands of the experiment were to "define right and responsibility clearly, separate government function from enterprise management, and operate scientifically”. Those requirements were in fact the basic characters concerning modern enterprises system. Along the policy of building MES system, and based upon the development of the whole economy, there were many achievements reached in the third phase.
1) By 2000, most large and middle scale SOEs have set up modern enterprise system tentatively. According to the investigation in 2473 enterprises of State Statistics Bureau 2000, 2016 enterprises have restructured, account 81.5%. Among those enterprises, 603 turned to Co., Ltd., accounts for 29.9%; 713 were restructured to limited companies, accounts for 35.4%; the number of solely state-owned company is 700, accounts for 34.7%. As for their management, 82.2% established shareholders’ meeting, 95.1% established the board of directors, and the board of supervisors has been established in 84.5% of enterprises. Therefore, corporate governance structure has already taken shape in SOEs.
2) In this phase, during" the Ninth Five-Year Plan", China began to adjust the state-run economic layout strategically, The idea called Zhuada Fangxiao (to grab the big ones and let the small ones go). The reform for medium and large SOEs focused on fostering a batch of trans-regional, inter-trade, inter-ownership big SOE groups through reorganizing, transforming, uniting annex. In 1997, the number of national large-scale enterprise groups expands to 120. For instance, under approval by the State Council, China Petrochemical Corporation, China Oil and Natural Gas Corporation were predominated to two large groups, whose assets of enterprise group reached in 40 billion dollars, such measure improved the intensification degree and international competitiveness of Chinese petrochemical industry greatly. Another example was in telecommunication market, six major SOE telecom groups (China Telecom, China Mobile, China Unicom, China satellite communication, China railway communication) were predominated. So a new form of competition in field of communication service took shape.
By the end of 2001, national key enterprises add up to 2710, total assets up to 1,280,450 million dollar. Among 179 super-huge enterprise groups, whose business income is over 500 million dollar, there are 165 state-owned or state-holding enterprise groups.
3) During this phase, separating government function from enterprise management was strengthened harder than before. Chinese government started administrative organization structure reform in 1998. Through this administrative restructure, the departments of the State Council reduced from 40 to 29. At provincial level, government departments reduced from 55 on average to 40, about 20% departments were simply. Some departments were cancelled totally. The cancellation of government departments indicated that the SOE stay in the charge of specialized official department manages changed completely. Meanwhile, the administration rank of the state-owned enterprise were cancelled, some administrative approval procedure were simplified.
4) To relieve the social burden of SOEs, re-employment service center were set up to shunt the redundant staff of enterprises. It has been a great difficult problem of the SOE reform from begin on that enterprises are overstaffed. It is an important measure of revitalizing the SOEs to dismiss and distribute workers. In June 1998, the state council required all regions to set up re-employment service center system. National Ministry of Labor and Social Security emphasized that the laid-off worker in SOEs must 100% enter the re-employment service center. The re-employment service center determined to provide serve functions such as grant basic living cost, withhold social insurance, organize job training and launch employment etc. for laid-off worker. The fund, which used for ensuring laid-off worker's basic life and paying the social insurance premium, come from financial budget, enterprise as well as societies (namely form contribution or from laid-off worker themselves), each part bears 1/3 of the whole fund. The re-employment service center provides service for laid-off workers for at longest 3 years. When they can’t reemploy after this period, can still enjoy unemployment compensation or the society relieve according to relevant regulation.
In this reform stage, re-employment service center played a positive role on maintain social stability. From 1998 to the end of 2001, 25,500,000 laid-off workers emerged (Fig 3) in national state-owned enterprises, among them more than 17 million people were reemployed, more than 3 million people retired. However, re-employment service center was only a transitional institute, because the SOE had to still take responsibility to settle down those laid off workers. According to a new policy, all laid-off workers after 2001 are treat as unemployed and have to enter free labor force market.
5) In order to extricate SOE from predicament, especially to resolve the problem of high liability-asset ratio, by December 2000, 580 SOEs began to implement debt-to-share swap, that mean the enterprises’ debt were recalculated as share (enterprises’ equity), so that the interest burden of SOEs were lightened. In the process, most of unperformed loans would be calculated as shares, which would be gathered and supervised by a new state commission-- State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). Till 2001, the total amount of money of debt-to-equity swap account 40,5 billion dollars, and the result was that the average asset-liability ratio of debt-to-share swapped enterprises dropped from more than 70% to under 50%.

2. The main problems left in the reform
After three steps reform, the SOE acquired more autonomy, as we have seen, the whole economic circumstance were also better. But because the reform did not touch the socialism idea from begin on, thus the transition of ownership of SOE was left basically unchanged, the defects of SOE could not changed completely. In the context of China’s economic reforms, there are still a few problems in SOE sector existed and have also a deep influence.
First of all, the interventions from the government still maintained influence in SOE. The administrative relation between enterprise and government is still remaining. Even the Local State Assets management office was established, it belong to the same bureaucratic system like former authorities. It can appoint or remove senior executives of SOEs. If enterprise applies to the broad structure, the directors in broad are appointed by it. The office has also a say in the transfer of holdings, corporate mergers, closures or other major changes to the enterprises, it is also charged with the tasks of clarifying property rights and settling disputes (3) . It seemed that the state assets supervisory takes the place of former authority above the SOEs. Moreover, the local government maintains still strong power in local enterprise, they rely on each other as we discussed above. So long as the enterprises are state-owned, whether they are big groups, stock companies or little entities, it is difficult to shaking off the directly or indirectly control from the government.
Secondly, because of the long tradition, enterprises are still taking responsibilities for their employees in pension, medical areas, therefore the so-called “soft budget constraint” cannot be given up completely. Although we have discussed that the Chinese government has managed to start re-employment plan, SOEs also take a part of the fund to support the plan. Correspondenly, government had to shoulder some failures resulted from the mismanagement of SOEs’ and avoid from their bankruptcy, in order to prevent the enterprise from bankrupcy and thus endanger the social stability.
Thirdly, the management of SOEs has low quality compare with other economic sectors. Though SOEs have produced an average 10% growth rate in the value of industrial output during the period 1978-98, this rate is considerably below the average of other sectors. The problem has two reasons. One of them is lacking of the inner incentive of the managers. The SOE managers are not entrepreneurs in the true sense, but bureaucrats at any rate. Their appointment by the government not basically according to their managerial capability, but based on their rankings in the bureaucratic hierarchy through the politic system. Another factor concerns the supervision within the SOE, it is also lacking in most cases. In practice, the position of supervisor in a enterprise is normally taken by staff within the enterprise and in most cases, the position of president of the supervision committee is taken by somebody within the enterprise, who is under the leadership of the directors and managers in his ranks both at work and in the Party. This system makes it very hard for the supervision committee to fully perform its authority (4) .
Fourth, the high liability-asset ratio is also regarded as a fatal problem of SOEs. It was observed, that during the reform period, the liability-asset ratio of industrial SOEs rose from around 11% in 1978 to approximately 65% in 1997. In as many as one-fourth of industrial SOEs, liabilities have even come to exceed assets; these enterprises are in fact insolvent. The World Bank suggests that in debt restructuring may be necessary for the most heavily indebted enterprises to bankrupt. After the implement of debt-to-share swap, the ratio decreased, but the debtor, in most cases are banks, didn’t collect the loan back, so it made the SOE even harder to get new loan for production. (5)
Furthermore, the whole process of the SOE reform companied by a serials of social problems, in compare to some difficulties such as lack or reserve labor force, ageing of the equipments, the most troublesome is the unemployment in large scales. In addition, in rural areas, millions of flowing population has been produced because of the bankruptcy and low profitability of the township and village enterprise. In urban China there are frequent reports about workers’ unrest. Although until now China still maintain a relative political stability, the menace will not fade away in a short time.

山西省人大常委会


山西省非物质文化遗产条例


（2012年9月日山西省第十一届人民代表大会常务委员会第三十一次会议通过）




第一章总则

第一条为了加强非物质文化遗产保护、保存工作，继承和弘扬优秀传统文化，根据《中华人民共和国非物质文化遗产法》等法律、法规，结合本省实际，制定本条例。
第二条本条例所称非物质文化遗产，是指各族人民世代相传并视为其文化遗产组成部分的各种传统文化表现形式，以及与传统文化表现形式相关的实物和场所。包括：
（一）传统口头文学以及作为其载体的语言；
（二）传统美术、书法、音乐、舞蹈、戏剧、曲艺和杂技；
（三）传统技艺、医药和历法；
（四）传统礼仪、节庆等民俗；
（五）传统体育和游艺；
（六）其他非物质文化遗产。
作为非物质文化遗产组成部分的实物和场所，凡属文物的，适用文物保护法律、法规的有关规定。
第三条非物质文化遗产保护、保存应当正确处理经济建设、社会发展与非物质文化遗产开发、利用的关系，对非物质文化遗产采取认定、记录、建档等措施予以保存，对体现优秀传统文化，具有历史、文学、艺术、科学价值的非物质文化遗产采取传承、传播等措施予以保护。
第四条县级以上人民政府应当将非物质文化遗产保护、保存工作纳入本级国民经济和社会发展规划，将保护、保存经费列入本级财政预算。
第五条县级以上人民政府应当将国家级和省级文化生态保护区、非物质文化遗产展示场馆、传习所和生产性保护示范基地的建设纳入本行政区域城乡规划。
第六条县级以上人民政府文化主管部门负责本行政区域内非物质文化遗产的保护、保存工作。
非物质文化遗产保护工作机构在同级文化主管部门的领导下，组织实施非物质文化遗产的保护、保存工作。
县级以上人民政府发展和改革、财政、经济和信息化、教育、民族宗教、商务、住房和城乡建设、规划、环境保护、国土资源、旅游、文物、体育等部门，按照各自职责负责非物质文化遗产的保护、保存工作。
第七条文化站、村民委员会、居民委员会在文化主管部门指导和支持下，开展相应的非物质文化遗产保护、保存工作。
文学艺术界联合会、科学技术协会、作家协会和有关行业协会、学会等组织按照各自章程，做好非物质文化遗产的保护、保存工作。
第八条鼓励和支持公民、法人和其他组织捐赠非物质文化遗产实物资料或者捐赠资金和实物，用于非物质文化遗产的保护、保存工作。

第二章非物质文化遗产代表性项目名录

第九条县级以上人民政府应当组织对本行政区域内的非物质文化遗产进行调查。
文化主管部门和其他有关部门应当对发现的非物质文化遗产予以确认、记录，并收集属于非物质文化遗产组成部分的代表性实物，整理调查所取得的资料，建立非物质文化遗产档案和数据库。
第十条县级以上人民政府应当将本行政区域内体现优秀传统文化，具有历史、文学、艺术、科学价值的非物质文化遗产项目，列入本级非物质文化遗产代表性项目名录，并报上一级人民政府文化主管部门备案。
县级以上人民政府文化主管部门对列入非物质文化遗产代表性项目名录的项目确定保护单位，保护单位履行下列职责：
（一）收集该项目的实物、资料，并登记、整理、建档；
（二）推荐非物质文化遗产代表性项目的代表性传承人；
（三）制定并实施该项目保护计划，定期向文化主管部门报告实施情况并接受监督；
（四）开展该项目的宣传、展示、展演活动；
（五）为该项目传承及相关活动提供必要条件；
（六）其他应当履行的职责。
第十一条设区的市、县（市、区）人民政府可以将本级非物质文化遗产代表性项目向上一级人民政府文化主管部门推荐，经认定后列入上一级非物质文化遗产代表性项目名录。
第十二条公民、法人和其他组织可以向县级人民政府文化主管部门提出列入本级非物质文化遗产代表性项目名录的申请。
申请材料包括申请报告、项目申报书以及其他相关材料。
第十三条公民、法人和其他组织认为某项非物质文化遗产具有重大历史、文学、艺术、科学价值的，可以向省人民政府文化主管部门提出列入省级非物质文化遗产代表性项目名录的建议。
第十四条非物质文化遗产代表性项目的认定实行专家评审制度。评审工作应当遵循公开、公平、公正的原则。
第十五条非物质文化遗产代表性项目的认定应当经过以下程序:
(一)文化主管部门组织专家评审小组对推荐、申请或者建议列入非物质文化遗产代表性项目名录的项目进行初评，经专家评审小组成员过半数通过后形成初评意见；
（二）文化主管部门组织专家评审委员会对初评意见进行审议，提出审议意见；
（三）文化主管部门将拟列入本级非物质文化遗产代表性项目名录的项目通过媒体公示征求公众意见，公示时间不少于二十日。
文化主管部门根据评审委员会的审议意见和公示结果，拟订本级非物质文化遗产代表性项目名录，报本级人民政府批准后公布。
第十六条公民、法人和其他组织对拟列入非物质文化遗产代表性项目名录的项目有异议的，应当在公示期间提出书面意见。文化主管部门经调查核实，情况属实的，终止对该项目的认定；情况不属实的，应当在收到书面意见之日起二十日内书面告知异议人并说明理由。

第三章非物质文化遗产代表性项目的代表性传承人

第十七条县级以上人民政府文化主管部门对本级人民政府批准公布的非物质文化遗产代表性项目，可以认定代表性传承人。
公民、法人和其他组织在征得被推荐人书面同意的前提下，可以向文化主管部门推荐非物质文化遗产代表性项目的代表性传承人人选。公民也可以自行申请代表性传承人。
第十八条非物质文化遗产代表性项目的代表性传承人应当符合下列条件：
（一）熟练掌握其传承的非物质文化遗产；
（二）具有传承谱系和特定领域内的代表性、影响力；
（三）积极开展传承活动，培养传承人才。
第十九条认定非物质文化遗产代表性项目的代表性传承人，参照本条例有关非物质文化遗产代表性项目评审程序进行。
非物质文化遗产代表性项目的代表性传承人经县级以上人民政府文化主管部门认定后予以公布。
第二十条非物质文化遗产代表性项目的代表性传承人享有下列权利：
（一）开展传艺、技艺展示、艺术创作、学术研究等活动；
（二）享受人民政府规定的传承补助；
（三）按照师承形式或者其他方式选择、培养传承人；
（四）参加有关活动取得相应报酬；
（五）提出非物质文化遗产保护工作的意见、建议；
（六）开展传承、传播活动确有困难的，可以向文化主管部门申请支持。
第二十一条非物质文化遗产代表性项目的代表性传承人应当履行下列义务：
（一）开展传承活动，常随学徒不少于二人；
（二）配合非物质文化遗产调查工作；
（三）参与非物质文化遗产公益性宣传活动；
（四）妥善保存相关的实物、资料。
非物质文化遗产代表性项目的代表性传承人无正当理由不履行传承义务，文化主管部门经调查核实，情况属实的，按照规定的程序取消其代表性传承人资格并重新认定该项目的代表性传承人。

第四章非物质文化遗产的保护措施

第二十二条县级以上人民政府对非物质文化遗产代表性项目集中、特色鲜明、形式和内涵保持完整的特定区域，在尊重当地居民意愿的前提下，可以设立文化生态保护区，制定专项保护规划，实施区域性整体保护。
在文化生态保护区内从事生产、建设和开发，应当符合文化生态保护区的专项保护规划，不得破坏非物质文化遗产及其所依存的建（构）筑物、场所、遗迹等。
第二十三条县级以上人民政府应当对与非物质文化遗产代表性项目直接关联的遗址、遗迹及其附属物划定保护范围，制定保护规划，建立专门档案，并在土地利用总体规划、城乡规划和建设中采取措施予以整体保护。
第二十四条县级以上人民政府应当统筹协调发展和改革、财政、文化、旅游等部门制定非物质文化遗产开发利用规划，保护和传承非物质文化遗产。
鼓励和支持有关单位和个人有效保护、合理利用非物质文化遗产资源，开发具有地方特色、市场潜力的文化产品和文化服务。
第二十五条县级以上人民政府应当对濒危的传统音乐、传统舞蹈、传统戏剧等非物质文化遗产代表性项目，采取专门保护措施，实施恢复性生产保护，资助公益性展演、展示活动。
第二十六条县级以上人民政府应当根据经济社会的发展，增加非物质文化遗产保护、保存经费的投入。非物质文化遗产保护、保存经费主要用于下列事项：
（一）非物质文化遗产的调查；
（二）非物质文化遗产代表性项目保护工作；
（三）非物质文化遗产代表性项目的代表性传承人的补助；
（四）濒危非物质文化遗产的抢救；
（五）非物质文化遗产代表性项目的研究；
（六）非物质文化遗产资料和实物的征集和收购；
（七）非物质文化遗产的档案及数据库建设；
（八）非物质文化遗产的宣传、教育；
（九）非物质文化遗产保护、保存的其他事项。
第二十七条县级以上人民政府根据非物质文化遗产保护、保存的需要，建立非物质文化遗产博览园、专题博物馆、传习所等公共文化设施。
第二十八条非物质文化遗产代表性项目含有国家秘密的，按照国家保密法律法规的规定确定密级，予以保护；含有商业秘密的，按照国家有关法律法规执行。
第二十九条县级以上人民政府文化主管部门负责对本行政区域内非物质文化遗产代表性项目的保护、保存情况进行监督检查。
第三十条鼓励和支持大专院校、科研机构开展非物质文化遗产科学研究工作，培养和引进相关领域专业人才。
第三十一条文化馆（站）、图书馆、博物馆、美术馆、体育场馆等公共文化体育机构，应当有计划地展示非物质文化遗产代表性项目，并按照国家和省有关规定向社会免费开放。
第三十二条鼓励和支持公共教育机构建立非物质文化遗产传承教学基地，开展非物质文化遗产知识普及活动。
报刊、广播电视、网络等媒体应当通过专题展示、专栏介绍、公益广告等方式，普及非物质文化遗产知识。

第五章法律责任

第三十三条违反本条例规定，截留、挪用、挤占非物质文化遗产保护、保存经费的，由县级以上人民政府有关部门责令返还，对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员依法给予处分；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
第三十四条违反本条例规定，在申请非物质文化遗产代表性项目、代表性传承人过程中弄虚作假的，由县级以上人民政府文化主管部门给予警告；已列入非物质文化遗产代表性项目名录或者取得代表性传承人资格的，由县级以上人民政府或者文化主管部门予以撤销，责令返还项目保护费或者传承人补助费。
第三十五条文化主管部门和其他有关部门的工作人员在非物质文化遗产保护、保存工作中，玩忽职守、滥用职权、徇私舞弊的，依法给予处分；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。

第六章附则

第三十六条本条例自2013年1月1日起施行。